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Introduction* 
 
In 1936, five decades after municipal electrical distribution systems were 
first constructed in the United States, the process of introducing rural areas to the 
twentieth-century economy began with the creation of the Rural Electrification 
Administration.  The R.E.A. encouraged rural Americans to form electrical 
cooperatives to overcome the unwillingness of private utilities to bring power to 
households, farms and businesses in sparsely populated regions where profits 
were too low.  Today, on the dawn of a new century, a remarkably similar 
dilemma confronts rural residentswho will provide a broadband infrastructure 
in places where profit incentives do not exist? 
This paper explores commonalities in these two episodes.  In the case of 
the R.E.A., the necessity for an aggressive federal initiative to wire rural 
America, where the market for electricity had failed, is revisited.  The absent 
incentives, which left rural areas literally and figuratively in the dark, are 
identified and explored.  We then examine the similarities between rural 
electrification and rural high-speed Internet access through how consumers 
currently and prospectively gain access to broadband Internet service in an 
incentive-poor market.  The regulatory environment created by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Federal Communications Commission 
over the past decade is considered in light of the failure of the market to deliver 
high-speed Internet access to rural America.   Finally, we pose the question of 
whether a federal effort equivalent to the R.E.A. is needed to ensure that 
residents of sparsely populated areas, like their predecessors in the 1930s, are not 
comparatively disadvantaged in the first decades of the 21st Century.         
                                                           
* The sections of this paper on the history of the R.E.A. are adapted from Laurence J. Malone, "Rural 
Electrification Administration." EH.Net Encyclopdia, edited by Robert Whaples, August 15 2001 URL 
http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/contents/malone.electrification.administration.rural.php 
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Market Failure in Delivering Electricity to Rural Areas Before 1930 
 
The advent of electricity in the 1880s ushered forward a rapidly 
expanding domestic market in the United States that would be dominated by 
heavy industries for a hundred years.  The physical scale of the electric utility 
industry mirrored the national economy that sprung up with itmassive central 
generating stations, substantial capital investments for network construction, 
high maintenance costs, and production technologies that were obtrusive and 
degrading to the natural environment.  But the adaptation of electricity to 
manufacturing and services further liberated the nineteenth-century economy 
from proximity to moving water and, with welcoming immigration and 
naturalization policies, accelerated the pace of urbanization.   
While urban households gained electricity in large numbers after 1910, the 
more sparsely populated rural regions of the United States were generally 
without electricity and were denied the commercial progress it brought.  
Electrical providers ignored the rural market due to its high network 
construction costs and the prospect of meager immediate profits.  From the 
supplier standpoint, rural homes, farms and businesses were stretched too far 
apart and offered too little revenue relative to the cost of investment.  Unlike 
their counterparts in cities, rural residents were expected to advance the 
financing for the necessary infrastructure to the firm supplying electrical power 
from a distant location.  In rural areas that were serviced, electrical rates in the 
1920s were twice as high as urban rates.1   
The disincentives to investment in electrical infrastructure left rural 
America increasingly distant from rising living standards in urban and emerging 
suburban settings.  Lacking the greater productive efficiencies secured by the 
adaptation of electricity, productivity growth in agriculture, the industry that 
served as the central organizing principle for rural life, lagged other sectors in 
the economy over the 1880 to 1930 period.  Rural demands for the newest 
manufactured items found in urban American homestelephones, radios, 
refrigerators, washing machines, hot water heaters, and household appliances
were latent.  Given the widening disparities between rural and urban settings, it 
was not surprising that rural Americans reverted to the cooperative lifestyles of 
the nineteenth century as the urban markets for their agricultural products 
collapsed in the Great Depression. 
 
The Origins of the New Deal Rural Electrification Initiative 
 
The failure of the market to deliver affordable electricity led to over thirty 
state rural power initiatives during the 1920s and early 1930s, as President 
Herbert Hoover argued that responsibility for rural electrification rested with 
state government.2   Governor of New York Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
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aggressively promoted rural electrification, and the New York Power Authority 
was created in 1931 to develop a substantial new source of inexpensive 
hydroelectric generating capacity along the St. Lawrence River.3   But the 
Depression led to the collapse of many state power authorities and further raised 
the bar in discouraging private investment in rural electrical infrastructure.  
When Roosevelt assumed the Presidency on March 4, 1933, the market for rural 
electrification no longer existed.   
While Roosevelt clearly understood the benefits of rural electrification, it 
was Morris L. Cooke who provided vision and leadership to rural electrification 
efforts under the New Deal.  Cooke had led Giant Power, the Pennsylvania rural 
electrification program, and Roosevelt invited him to address the problem at the 
federal level.  Using data supplied by the utility industry, electrical engineers, 
Giant Power, and the U.S. Census of 1930, Cooke authored an eleven-page report 
in 1934 that provided the foundation for a federal rural electrification program.  
Cooke provided detailed estimates of the cost per mile of high wire 
distribution lines in rural regions.  He wrote:  This cost of the line with 
transformers and meters included for one to three customers will range from 
$500 to $800 the mile.  To amortize this cost in twenty years at four percent 
involves a cost to each of the three customers on a mile of line of about one dollar 
a month.4  Studies commissioned by Cooke suggested that household payments 
for electricity would be a minimum of one dollar per month for the first ten 
kilowatts of electricity, three cents per kilowatt for the next forty kilowatts, and 
two cents per kilowatt for the remaining balance.5  All told, the estimated cost to 
provide electricity to 500,000 farms, at an average of three farms per mile of road, 
was $112 million, or $225 per farm.  In a worst case scenario, if new generating 
facilities were needed for all 500,000 farms, the 333 power plants required would 
cost an additional $87 million.  Consequently, Cookes high-end estimate for the 
complete electrical infrastructure needed to bring electrical service to 500,000 
farms was $200 million, or $400 per farm.6  The concluding paragraph of his 
report states that a new rural electrification agency should build the necessary 
infrastructure since the market would not otherwise furnish electricity to 
sparsely populated localities.7 
Presidential Executive Order 7037 created the Rural Electrification 
Administration, or R.E.A., on May 11, 1935.  With passage of the Norris-Rayburn 
Act the following year, Congress authorized $410 million in appropriations for a 
ten-year program to electrify American farms.   The rural cooperative model, 
which had been successfully employed by Giant Power in Pennsylvania, was 
adopted by the R.E.A., with Congressional Representatives serving as the 
administrative liaisons for the formation of cooperatives within their districts.8   
Cooperatives were consumer-owned firms organized to provide electric service 
to member-customers.  Each cooperative was typically governed by a board of 
directors elected from the ranks of its customers.  The board established rates 
and policies, and hired a general manager to conduct the ordinary business of 
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providing electricity within the service region.  Only two restrictions were placed 
on the formation of cooperatives: they could not compete directly with utility 
companies, and coop members could not live in areas served by utilities or 
within a municipality with a population of 1500 or more.9   
The R.E.A. was essentially a government-financing agency providing 
subsidized loans for the construction of electrical supply infrastructure in rural 
regions.  The loans were guaranteed by the federal government and had an 
attractive interest rate and a generous repayment schedule of 25 years.  The 
interest rate initially matched the federal funds rate when the loan was executed, 
but after 1944 the rate was fixed at 2%.10   R.E.A. loans furnished the incentive for 
rural electric cooperatives to form and connect to the existing electrical network 
at rates comparable to the national average.  R.E.A. cooperatives quickly became 
one of the largest capital investment projects of the New Deal, and low-cost 
financing for construction of electrical supply infrastructure was the key 
provision of the program.11  
 
R.E.A.:  The Outcomes 
 
The R.E.A. is one of the most immediate and profound successes in the 
history of federal policy-making.  By the end of 1938, after just two years, 350 
cooperative projects in 45 states were delivering electricity to 1.5 million farms.12  
The success of the R.E.A. over the long-term was even more impressive, 
especially as a self-sustained agency.  Monies lent through the R.E.A. were 
largely repaid, as the default rate on loans was less than 1%.13   By the mid-1950s 
nearly all American farms had electrical service that was provided through the 
R.E.A. or by other means.   New demands for household electrical appliances 
spurred growth in home appliance manufacturing, and spawned the electrical 
and plumbing trades in rural communities.  Electrical service also brought 
revolutionary new mediums of communication to rural farms, firms and 
households.  Radio was followed by television, and the new streams of 
information narrowed the cultural, educational and commercial divide between 
urban and rural America.   Rural electrification also contributed to the rapid 
growth of suburbs, and helped create a more integrated national market.   
In 1994, Congress established the Rural Utilities Service (R.U.S.) as a 
federal agency within the United States Department of Agriculture, and it 
absorbed the R.E.A. and its responsibilities for rural electrification.   Table 1 
compares the share of the electric utility market for investor-owned companies, 
publicly owned companies, and rural cooperatives in the United States in 1998.  
Rural electric cooperatives still serve 11 percent of the nations population and 
deliver 9 percent of the kilowatt hours sold.  The data also indicate that rural 
markets continue to impose hardships to producers for costs and revenues.  
Cooperatives account for a much smaller portion of revenue per mile of wire 
(($7,873) than investor or publicly owned electrical utilities (($60,921 and $70,670, 
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respectively), and a greater portion of distribution plant investment per 
consumer.   To date, the R.E.A. and R.U.S. have organized nearly $57 billion in 
federally guaranteed low interest loans for the development of electric 
cooperatives.  The success of these programs, and the revolutionary outcomes, in 
both commercial sectors and in the organization of the home in rural America, is 
not unlike the outcomes to be expected from the penetration of the high-speed 
Internet into rural America. 
 
 
Table 1: Electric Utility Market Comparisons, United States, 1998 
  Investor Owned 
Publicly 
Owned  
Rural 
Cooperatives  
Number of Organizations  239 2009 930 
Customers, % of U.S. total  74% 15% 11% 
Revenues, % of U.S. total  77% 14% 9% 
Kilowatt hour sales, % of total  75% 15% 9% 
Number of consumers, per mile of 
line  33 43 6 
Revenue per mile of line, in dollars  60,921 70,670 7,873 
Distribution plant investment per 
consumer, in dollars  1,890 1,870 2,352 
Assets, in $ billions  606 126 70 
Source: National Rural Electric Cooperative Association Strategic Analysis, 
March 1999, www.nreca.org/coops/elecoop3.html  
 
 
Internet Access in Rural America 
 
As was the case seventy years ago with rural electrification, private 
initiatives cannot deliver the infrastructure for affordable high-speed Internet 
access in sparsely populated rural areas of the United States today.  While many 
small cities and towns are beginning to reap the benefits of high-speed Internet 
access, much of rural America is being left behind as providing firms vie instead 
for more lucrative profits in densely populated cities and suburbs.  The problem 
for rural America is that plenty of firms are able to supply Internet content, but 
firms are generally unwilling to build the infrastructure necessary to deliver that 
content at a cost comparable to more densely populated locales. 
Better telecommunications infrastructure is needed to deliver high-speed 
Internet service, and high-speed Internet service is needed to deliver band-
consuming content.  Bandwidth measures information in flows of bits, which 
incorporate content and move over a given distance, in a period of time.  
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Broadband width, as compared to narrow, simply means that more information 
is transferred at vastly greater speed.  With Internet content, the visual acronym 
WYSIWYG is still germanewhat-you-see-is-what-you-get in terms of content 
that the infrastructure can load and carry.  Content quality is determined solely 
by the telecommunications infrastructure that brings it to visual plates in 
households and workplaces.  The dilemma of rural high-speed Internet access is 
not in the development of content, but in whether the telecommunications 
infrastructure can deliver content to rural homes and businesses. 
 Three core technologies furnish the non-trunk line infrastructure for 
Internet telecommunications:  telephone lines, cable television wires, and 
wireless technologies for land-based antennas (fixed-wireless) and earth-orbiting 
satellites.  While telephone wires have existed for over a century, fiber-optic 
cable has greatly expanded the carrying capacity of telephone wire from 
narrowband to broadband ranges.  So, too, has the carrying capacity of cable 
television wire been enhancedto the point where cable firms can offer analog 
video, digital video, Internet, and telephone services.  Cable television originally 
brought higher content (in volume of channels) to many rural towns where 
wireless television broadcasting signals had been compromised by distance 
and terrain.  Wireless telecommunications technologies for consumers emerged 
in the 1970s, when satellites brought the content of cable television to rural areas 
that cable companies failed to serve because they were too costly to wire, and 
cellular telephones brought a whole new architecture to voice communications.  
But rural America lags far behind in wireless telephone service, and many rural 
areas remain blacked out.    
 As modem users well know, telephone wires were the original carrying 
infrastructure for the Internet.  Most Americans still access the Internet through a 
narrowband modem connection of 56k or less, over a dedicated or non-dedicated 
telephone line.  Research firm Juniper Communications forecasts that 80% of 
users will remain connected to the Internet via standard modem in 2002.14  
Access to the Internet through telephone lines, at greater speeds, occurs through 
two broadband enhancements to the technology: fiber-optic cable and digital 
subscriber line service, or D.S.L.  Using existing copper telephone lines, D.S.L. 
achieves information-transfer speeds that are ten times faster than typical phone 
modems.  Along fiber-optic lines, D.S.L. offers the fastest connection attainable at 
a cost comparable to the best alternatives.  Unlike cable Internet service, each 
customer has a dedicated line, which minimizes fluctuations in speed and 
provides a secure connection.  But D.S.L. offers nothing to rural Americans 
because it is only available to households and firms located within 17,500 feet (a 
little over three miles) of a central telephone office, and the 30,000 offices 
nationwide are concentrated in densely populated areas.  
The use of the original coaxial cable television wire for Internet 
telecommunications infrastructure also has considerable drawbacks.  Coaxial 
cable provides one-way high-speed Internet service, since the wire was designed 
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to bring in a few dozen channels of television, not to return signals to the cable 
provider.  Much of the national cable infrastructure was installed in the 1970s, 
and while the carrying capacity can bring Internet content into households and 
workplaces at high-speed, content sent out slows to speeds equivalent to a 56k 
modem or less.  Because of this limited capacity, cable companies are rushing to 
replace the coaxial infrastructure with a Hybrid Fiber-Optic Coaxial Cable 
System (H.F.C.) that compresses television, Internet, and telephone service into 
one line.  But technical problems compromise high-speed H.F.C. service.  If there 
is only one user of a cable connection in a neighborhood, the incoming speed 
over an H.F.C. network can approach 500 times faster than a 56k modem.  If, on 
the other hand, many neighborhood users simultaneously tap the same H.F.C. 
cable for Internet access, the incoming speed plunges to narrowband ranges.  An 
observer writes:  If one of your cable-using neighbors starts running a Web 
server out of the home, you can imagine neighbors marching with torches and 
pitchforks. 15 
NxGen Data Research estimates that by 2003, cable will deliver high-speed 
Internet access to 8.4 million users, compared to 5 million D.S.L. users, 450,000 
wireless broadband and 900,000 satellite users.16  Eighty percent of existing cable 
networks in the United States have been upgraded to H.F.C.17  AT&T, owner of 
TCI, is spending $15 billion alone to upgrade the TCI cable system.18  An 
observer recently noted that the converging Internet, cable TV and telephone 
industries are spending billions of dollars to make broadband a realityat an 
estimated construction cost of $400 to $500 a household, whether the broadband 
connection is through a cable system or a telephone line.  The effort represents 
the most extensive and expensive engineering project in residential 
communications since the cable TV industry started wiring neighborhoods in the 
1960s.19  But the telecommunications infrastructure upgrade war is only being 
waged in American cities and suburbs. 
It comes as no surprise that upgrades in cable and telephone 
infrastructure have occurred first in the most lucrative markets.  It is time to also 
acknowledge, from our national legacy with rural electrification and cable 
television, that the economies of connecting consumers separated by hundreds of 
feet or more will never justify building a state-of-the-art cable infrastructure in 
rural areas.  Were it not for the development and wide-diffusion of satellite 
television technologies in the last three decades, rural America would still be 
holding out for larger roof antennas to capture signals from a handful of distant 
television stations.  Wireless technologies that promise to deliver broadband 
Internet service consequently represent something akin to a Holy Grail to rural 
Americans hoping to share in the spoils of faster Internet access.  But how 
affordable and realistic are these technologies? 
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Table 1:  Cost and Speed for Internet Service in Urban Areas 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Service         Delivery            Monthly cost          Speed 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dial Up        Phone line         $20                       56 kbps (or slower) 
 
ISDN           Phone line         $50 - $130               128 kbps 
 
Satellite        Phone line         $50 (for 100 hours)   400 kbps (or slower) 
          to wireless 
 
Cable            Cable                $30 - $65          up to 2.5  mbps 
 
DSL              Phone line  $50 - $1200                 up to 8 mbps 
 
Frame relay   Dedicated         $300 - $3000                 up to 45 mbps 
and T1/T3        fiber-optic 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  PC World, Six Routes to the Internet, with Speed and Cost, March 1999, p. 110.  
Estimates are for urban areas, only.  A companion article, Bandwidth on Demand, provides an 
excellent overview of the competing technologies that deliver Internet access.  
 
 
Cost and speed for infrastructure technologies that deliver Internet 
content to urban areas are compared in Table 1.  We can assume from industry 
unwillingness to invest that cable, D.S.L. and frame-relay are not cost-viable 
technologies in sparsely populated rural areas.  If there is to be a new 
infrastructure to deliver broadband Internet access to rural America it would 
appear that wireless stands alone among alternatives in the market.  Data from 
Table 1 indicates that the cost of wireless in urban areas is comparable to the 
other choices.  Assuming that wireless service can be provided at comparable 
cost, is the technology itself viable in rural areas? 
Broadband wireless Internet access can be furnished either through a 
land-based system of antennas (fixed wireless), directly from satellites, or from a 
system combining the two.  But any land-based wireless Internet transmission 
requires clear lines-of-sight between antennas, and signal obstructions are caused 
not only by hills and valleys, but also by buildings, trees, and even precipitation.  
A fixed wireless system that provides national coverage will require tens of 
thousands of land-based antennas, and even then cannot guarantee 
uninterrupted coverage.  Wireless Internet transmissions are also incompatible 
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with other wireless networks, and marketplace posturing and rivalries among 
competing technologies has led to an impasse on an agreement for industry 
standards among firms.  Moreover, as anyone who has benefited from a baby 
monitor knows, security concerns plague wireless transmissions.  Industry 
observers acknowledge that wireless broadband is more viable for urban areas, 
where roof-mounted base-station antennas in a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) 
configuration can cover a radius that encompasses most of a downtown.  As for 
rural areas, fixed wireless broadband work best on prairies, deserts or other 
areas with uniformly flat topography. 
Prospects are no better on the satellite-direct side of wireless technology, 
where communication remains a one-way medium between satellites and earth-
based stations.  To access the Internet via satellite from a keyboard or mouse 
requires both a satellite connection and an open telephone line.  This limits the 
speed of Internet access to the bandwidth range of the telephone connection.  As 
Business Week dourly notes, satellite data must be pumped out over a pokey 
standard phone line, and neither fixed wireless nor satellite service is expected 
to compete heavily with D.S.L. and Cable Modems.20  
Recent episodes with wireless satellite network communications further 
call the viability of the technology into question.  Between 1997 and 1999 
NYSERNet conducted a trial of a wireless multi-channel multi-point distribution 
service (M.M.D.S.), providing Internet access to ten schools in the Rochester, 
New York area.  CAI Wireless Systems, Inc. (since merged with MCI WorldCom) 
used a high-speed 10-mbps satellite downlink connection for the experiment.  
But the return, uplink path for this asymmetric service was a 28.8 kbps analog 
modem and a dedicated analog telephone line.  The NYSERNet final report on 
the experiment notes that in addition to the slow uplink, other obstacles included 
connection problems, weather interference, and government regulations.21  On a 
global scale, the decision by bankrupt Iridium, LLC to abandon and destroy its 
$5 billion worldwide telecommunications network of 88 satellites should give 
every champion of wireless Internet pause.22 
  
 
Regulatory Factors:  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the F.C.C. 
 
 
 The Federal Communications Commission is required by provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to take regulatory measures to ensure 
comparable and affordable access to the Internet for all Americans.  In particular, 
Section 254.b.3 Universal Service Principles: Access in Rural and High Cost 
Areas of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 states: 
 
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers 
and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to 
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telecommunications and information services, including interexchange 
services and advanced telecommunications and information services, that 
are reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas and 
that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to rates charged 
for similar services in urban areas.23 
 
 
 To date, even with a change in Presidential Administrations, the F.C.C. 
maintains the position that broadband Internet is a nascent, largely inchoate 
technology, and no remedial action is necessary to ensure universal access, or to 
require so-called carriers to directly contribute to universal access.24  The F.C.C. 
stance is that the market will eventually provide universal service to all 
Americans, even though the costs make it unlikely that rural Americans will see 
D.S.L. or cable Internet architectures competing with wireless technologies.*   
From the standpoint of the F.C.C., rural American hopes for high-speed Internet 
access hinge on Teledesic, Starband, Hughes Network Systems DirecPC, 
Wildblue, and SkyBridge.  Of these, only Teledesic, a privately-held company 
owned by Microsofts Bill Gates, cellular telephone pioneer Craig McCaw, 
Motorola, and Boeing, aims for complete global coverage.  Teledesic proposes to 
launch 288 satellites in low earth orbit (L.E.O.) for two-way digital voice, video, 
and data transmissions.  The system will cover 95% of the landmass surface and 
nearly 100% of the population of the planet at a cost of $9 billion.  Teledesic 
originally expected to begin service in 1999, and periodically pushes the service 
start date (now 2005) further into the future.25  But the technological pitfalls 
remain so deep that it will be a long time before wireless becomes the blanketing 
solution to broadband access in rural America. 
Another major stumbling block to high-speed Internet access in rural 
America comes from a provision in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
concerning infrastructure.  As was the case with the breakup of AT&T, the Act 
requires telecommunications firms owning infrastructure that delivers Internet 
content to share that infrastructure with other providers of content.  Sec 259.b.4  
Infrastructure Sharing: Terms and Conditions of Regulations states:    
 
The regulations prescribed by the Commission pursuant to this section 
shall ensure that such local exchange carrier makes such infrastructure, 
technology, information, facilities, or functions available to a qualifying 
                                                           
* The single exception to the FCC hands-off approach is the E-Rate program, where a tax on long distance 
telephone service finances Internet connections for schools and public libraries.  Enacted despite 
considerable Congressional skepticism, telephone companies pay a fee to the F.C.C., which uses the 
monies to promote point of service access.  Telephone firms recover the fee through a tax that costs 
consumers around 30 to 40 cents per month.  For 2000, the F.C.C. was authorized to collect $2.25 billion to 
further the initiative.  Still, only 39% of rural classrooms, compared to 62% of urban and suburban 
classrooms are connected to the Internet.  See Cheryl Rainford, Bridging the Digital Divide @griculture 
Online, July 14, 1999, www.agriculture.com/scgi/AgNews_tailNews_Asearch_listAgNews_html_41507. 
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carrier on just and reasonable terms and conditions that permit such 
qualifying carrier to fully benefit from the economies of scale and scope of 
such local exchange carrier, as determined in accordance with guidelines 
prescribed by the Commission in regulations issued pursuant to this 
section.26 
 
The sharing requirement does not apply however to local cable television 
franchises, which creates a host of distorted incentives that breed comparative 
advantages and disadvantages in the market.  The reigning incentive governing 
the high-speed Internet market is for firms to seek ownership and control of both 
infrastructure and content.  This is why Time-Warner, with substantial 
investment and ownership in cable networks throughout the nation, paired with 
AmericaOnLine.  While Time-Warner offered monopoly control over its cable 
infrastructure, it gained a first-mover advantage through the 20 million 
customers receiving their Internet content filtered through AOL.  The marriage 
yielded strategic comparative advantages among media giants navigating the 
regulatory framework that is shaping the market.  Other cable providers are 
extending the logic and consolidating monopoly control over urban and 
suburban markets through some rather novel arrangements.  In 2000, 
Cablevision, the leading cable firm in metropolitan New York, traded 357,000 of 
its customers in the Boston-area to Media One for 125,500 New York-area Media 
One customers and $1.16 billion in cash and stock.  Media One is a division of 
AT&T.27  Meanwhile, no provider fights for territory or postures to build new 
infrastructure for high-speed Internet access in rural America.  
The incentives to build rural high-speed Internet infrastructure are further 
dampened by provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that prohibit the 
Bell regional operating companies from directly competing in the market.  Bell 
companies have no incentive to replace the existing telephone infrastructure in 
rural America with lines (perhaps even H.F.C. cable) capable of delivering 
broadband Internet content and telephone service.  Freeing the Bell companies 
would encourage them to upgrade their rural telephone networks to provide 
affordable high-speed Internet access in places where D.S.L. cannot reach, cable 
companies have shown little past interest in wiring, and satellite and wireless 
await the future.  Such improvements would acknowledge the technological 
convergence that has occurred in wiring technologies for cable television, 
telephone and Internet pipe.  Removing the regulatory yoke would foster a 
competitive framework in the rural American Internet market with Bell 
companies and other telephone service providers upgrading their infrastructure 
as wireless service is being introduced.   
The crux of the rural American dilemma is that there is currently no 
incentive to build land-based wiring infrastructure for broadband Internet 
access.  Moreover, there are disincentives to build such networks, driven in part 
by market realities and in part by competitive restrictions in the 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the steadfast position of the F.C.C. not to 
intervene in the name of universal service.  
 
Voices Against Government Intervention 
 
 Early voices opposed to any effort on the part of the federal government 
to address the lack of a high-speed Internet infrastructure in rural America were 
varied and considerable.  In January 1998 the United States Internet Council 
published a focus group study of 60 interviews that it conducted with state 
legislators from 30 states.  The question what is the role of state government in 
bringing about the benefits of the Internet? was met, in the words of the 
Council, by silenceliteral dead silence.28  In comments on the merger of AOL 
and Time Warner, Bob Metcalfe, Founder of 3Com stated that the only thing to 
worry about on the broadband Internet is preserving freedom of choice among 
competing alternatives.  Worry about Big Business taking over the Internet if you 
wantAOL Time Warner, Microsoft and the telephone monopolies, for 
examplebut be sure to keep an eye on Big Government.29  In a press release 
issued at a broadband access hearing he conducted on April 11, 2000 
Representative Tom Bliley, (R, Virginia) Chair of the House of Representatives 
Committee on Commerce, stated that the Internet 
 
provides a digital opportunity for all Americans.  Some people have 
argued that services and products will only come to rural or urban centers 
if the federal government forces or mandates that it occur.  I think that 
today's witnesses are only a small slice of the examples of companies and 
organizations that are trying to solve any perceived deployment disparity 
problem rather than look for a federal government program.  
  
 
Nevertheless, a shift in thinking has occurred over the last two years 
among policy-makers who have contemplated the prospects for high-speed 
Internet access in rural America.  In July 1999, the United States Commerce 
Department published A Report on the Telecommunications and Information 
Technology Gap in America.  The so-called Daley Report noted the presence of 
a digital divide between suburban and urban areas and low-income urban and 
rural areas.30  Senator John McCain, who ran a spirited campaign for President 
through the 2000 Republican Primary season, was a pioneer sponsor of 
legislation (S. 1043, 106th Congress, The Internet Regulatory Freedom Act of 1999) 
that sought improved broadband Internet access in rural America through 
regulatory reform which would free local telephone companies to compete with 
local cable television franchises.  In March 2000 another early legislative initiative 
was proposed by a group of United States Senators with large rural 
constituenciesDorgan, Daschle, Baucus, Johnson and Harkin.  Their Rural 
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Broadband Enhancement Act (S. 2307, 106th Congress) would authorize the Rural 
Utilities Service of the United States Department of Agriculture to make loans 
and extend credit, from a $3 billion fund, to telecommunication carriers and 
affiliated companies to finance the deployment of broadband Internet service to 
rural communities.  The loans, for 30 years at 2% interest, would have gone to 
firms extending D.S.L., cable, fixed wireless or satellite wireless infrastructure to 
any community of less than 20,000 inhabitants. 
Legislative interest in broadband rural access has surged in the 107th 
Congress in 2001.  Bills pending fall into three categories:  opening the market to 
competition, tax credits for broadband build-out, and loan guarantees.  Among 
the bills introduced, several propose remedies directed to these categories.  H.R. 
1542 focuses on deregulation, S. 88, S. 150, S. 246, H.R. 267, and H.R. 1415 would 
offer rural broadband deployment tax credits and S. 428, H.R. 1416 and H.R. 1697 
propose grant and/or loan guarantees.  Of these initiatives interest has centered 
on H.R. 267 (English), H.R. 1542 (Tauzin), and S. 88 (Rockefeller).  H.R. 267 and S. 
88, the Broadband Internet Access Act of 2001, would provide tax credits to firms 
investing in infrastructure build out in rural and low income areas.  H.R 1542, the 
Internet Freedom and Deployment Act of 2001, would free Bell companies and 
incumbent telephone companies to provide broadband services in any market.  
Loan provisions appear to be the alternative least likely to gain legislative 
approval.           
 
Casting the Internet to Rural America 
 
The historical similarities and comparative analysis of rural electrification 
and high-speed Internet access suggests that the national goal of universal 
service is unlikely to be met in the near future.  Still, there are lessons to be 
learned from the comparative historical policy-making assessment of these two 
episodes of market failure in rural America.  Despite the objection that markets 
will eventually provide broadband services to rural America, a strong argument 
can be made for Federal government action to reverse the direction of a digital 
divide that grows by the day.  There may be no greater contribution to economic 
development in the first decades of the 21st century than federal government 
leadership in creating an incentive-rich environment for constructing rural high-
speed Internet infrastructure.  Building upon a foundation of national success 
with the R.E.A., federal action should embody the best of progressive policy-
making to nurture the market for high-speed Internet access in rural America. 
A policy that creates incentives for firms willing to wire rural America for 
broadband Internet must and can guarantee that no individual or industry is 
comparatively advantaged by favoritism, add no regulatory yoke to the market, 
and impose no additional burdens upon taxpayers.  The key component of such 
a policy is to foster the creation of infrastructure needed to carry bandwidth-rich 
Internet content to and from rural locales.  Incentives, in the form of the long-
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term, low interest loans, need not discriminate among competing technologies.  
Even the F.C.C. has stated a position consistent with policies that  
 
promote a competitive market by encouraging innovation, investment, 
and infrastructural build-out.  In so doing, government insures that 
innovative and cost-efficient services will be provided to consumers by a 
diversity of entitiesor multiple pipes to the homes.31 
 
The only significant hurdle to implementing an incentive-driven policy for 
rural broadband Internet access is that it has been difficult to determine, by 
conventional empirical measurement or spatial analysis, population distributions 
and densities that objectively identify what is meant by a rural locality.   
Assuming that we can measure accurately, do we use, for example, 5,000 persons 
per municipality or less than 100 persons per square mile?  Moreover, localized 
population density measurements, and even definitions of the scale of S.M.S.A.s, 
are subject to endless debates on which communities to include or exclude.  
Questions with respect to the fairness of the criteria employed in making those 
determinations are especially vulnerable to criticisms of political influence and 
meddling.    
Fortunately, a far more consistent and politically neutral definition of 
what is meant by rural is provided by the current market for high-speed 
Internet infrastructure.  In this market-determined definition, federally-financed 
loans could be made to firms willing to bring broadband Internet infrastructure 
to any geographic area that lacks access to cable television.  The answer to the question 
of where to apply the federal incentives thus rests squarely in those areas that are 
without a cable television infrastructure, since similar disincentives in the market 
prevented cable television from being brought to these remote rural locales.  In 
this way, the rural market for high-speed Internet infrastructure, through a 
federally sponsored loan program, could be opened with equal access and 
competitive footing, to cable television companies, telephone companies or other 
providers of telecommunications services.  Likewise, it would be reasonable to 
extend federal loans to firms that propose only to build infrastructure, cued to a 
high bandwidth standard, with the intention of leasing it to other Internet 
content providers.  
Loans designed to spur construction of broadband Internet infrastructure 
in rural America would differ, in one intriguing respect, from R.E.A. loans.  The 
broadband infrastructure loans provide incentives to firms to construct 
infrastructure, not to individuals to form cooperatives to construct infrastructure, 
as was the case with the R.E.A.  Direct loans to firms would negate fears of big- 
or micro-government management of Internet access in rural America.  
Moreover, since the low-cost loan incentive creates no shortage of competitors 
willing to build infrastructure, any fears concerning the monopolistic practices of 
publicly regulated utilities do not apply either.   
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Finally, with respect to federal funding, a loan program of this type would 
be both a fiscally prudent and progressive employment of federal monies, even 
in a changing environment where reconstruction, expenditures for military 
conflict, and the pressures of recession are likely to take precedence.  With the 
remarkably low default rate on R.E.A. loans, the American public should expect 
the monies advanced for the construction of rural Internet infrastructure to be 
repaid and then recycled into new loans or returned to the federal treasury. 
Lacking a high-speed rural Internet infrastructure, the consequences to the 
nation as a whole will increasingly mirror the plight of rural Americans without 
electricity in the decades prior to the Great Depression.  The question is no 
longer whether to maintain the status quo in the market for broadband Internet 
access, since the digital divide worsens the status quo by the day.  If sparsely 
populated regions continue to lag in high-speed Internet access, we tacitly accept 
diminished rural productivity, less substantial rural demands for commodities 
and services, lagging rural incomes, and widening income inequality.  Those 
who choose to live in rural America for its environmental attractiveness, low 
crime, family-centered lifestyle, and democratic educational institutions will be 
comparatively disadvantaged over the next decades.  When a federal effort to 
create incentives to invest in rural Internet infrastructure requires marginal 
investments that will eventually be repaid, and when a satisfactory formula to 
distribute those incentives to private sector investments can be devised, the 
absence of policy-making action to actively promote universal access is no longer 
justifiable.   
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